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A TALE OF TWO TRADE POWERS: BALANCING
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK BETWEEN THE EU AND US IN A
CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE
Sarah Ben-Moussa*
In order to remain economically competitive in an increasingly
global market, a growing number of countries have begun adapting
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements between each other. Legal
conflicts between countries with differing regulations and
international obligations must be negotiated before trade partners can
sign onto an agreement. However, even after implementation, disputes
can still arise between signing member states and foreign businesses
operating in their markets. A popular method of resolving these
disputes is investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), a system by which
individual companies can sue countries for alleged discriminatory
practices in an arbitral tribunal, rather than through a national court
system.
While ISDS is renowned for its efficiency and cost saving, many
NGOs and international groups feel its growing influence creates a
potential for companies to circumvent environmental regulations set
forth by countries, by binding countries to sentences created by
privately selected arbiters, rather than through traditional judicial
mechanisms.
This is particularly a concern in the negotiating of the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), an agreement between the
European Union and the United States that began negotiation in 2013,
especially because of their different levels of environmental
safeguards. Critics have argued that both the United States and the
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European Union will expose themselves to litigation by private actors
under the implementation of this trade agreement, incurring large
costs and increasing the potential for biased or one sided results.
This paper examines the benefits and the potential dangers of ISDS,
considering the increasing importance of free trade agreements in the
global economy, and exploring solutions to the current draft ISDS
provisions. ISDS mechanisms provide a much needed efficiency and
consensus to large-scale economic agreements. Any rules or
mechanisms that are written into T-TIP must balance efficiency and
environmental interests of contracting states, so that they may serve as
a viable long-term solution to global disputes.

INTRODUCTION
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) is a
trade and investment agreement between the United States and the
European Union that has been undergoing negotiations for the past
three years.1 President Barack Obama of the United States, European
Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission
President José Manuel Barroso publicly announced the onset of the
negotiations on June February 17, 2013.2 Given the size of the
negotiating parties, if successful, it is estimated that the T-TIP could
become the largest free trade agreement in world history,3 implicating
nearly half of the global GDP and total world trade.4
The agreement seeks to increase investment in both areas by
breaking down structural trade barriers,5 covering a broad area of
1.Office of the United States Trade Representative, Transatlantic Trade and

Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (2017) https://ustr.gov/ttip [https://perma.cc/JQ8T-9BL5].
2. See Press Release, United States Trade Representative, U.S., EU Announce
Decision to Launch Negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (Feb. 13, 2013), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2013/february/statement-US-EU-Presidents
[https://perma.cc/RUR8-HA8V].
3. See id.
4. See Neil Campbell et al., The Impact of New Transatlantic Trade Agreements
on Commercial and Investment Transactions, 16 BUS. L. INT’L 185, 187 (2015).
5. Sandra T. Fung, Negotiating Regulatory Coherence: The Costs and
Consequences of Disparate Regulatory Principles in the Transatlantic Trade and
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trade—including goods, services and establishment, investment
protection and public procurement.6 As expected, the announcement
of these negotiations triggered a fair amount of criticism from civil
society, particularly regarding the provisions of the draft agreement on
Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS).
This paper will focus on ISDS provisions as envisioned in the draft
agreement. Part I will examine the future of free trade, and the role of
ISDS within bilateral free trade agreements. It will focus specifically
on the basic structures of ISDS, and the international structures in
place for arbitrating claims that arise out of investment and trade
agreements, as well as issues of enforceability of rulings and
jurisdiction. Part II of this paper will be devoted to the controversy
behind the ISDS provisions in T-TIP, specifically regarding
environmental risk. It will first discuss the arguments for the
provisions’ inclusion, and then examine the risks associated with the
evasion of regulation by investors, faults in political insulation, and
flaws within the arbitration process. It will also examine differences
between the international environmental commitments of the United
States and the European Union. Part III will assess the validity of these
risks, and examine solutions to mitigate environmental risk in the
inclusion of ISDS provisions to the final agreement.
I. THE MECHANICS OF ISDS, AND ITS ROLE IN FREE
TRADE
This part discusses the general structure of ISDS and its role in free
trade agreements. First, it discusses the future of free trade in a
changing political climate, discussing recent shifts in political attitudes
towards free trade agreements, as well as the longevity of trade
agreements in similar political cycles. Then, it examines the mechanics
of ISDS, focusing on the ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, two popular
choices of rule for arbiters, and the rules referenced by the a draft

Investment Partnership Agreement Between the United States and the European
Union, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 445, 446 (2014).
6. Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic
and Scientific Policy, TTIP and Labour Standards, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 578.992
(2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578992/IPOL_
STU(2016)578992_EN.pdf.
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circulated by the working group on T-TIP. Finally, it details the role
of ISDS in free trade agreements, historically and looking forward.
A. The Future of Free Trade
The future of free trade has recently become a contentious topic in
the international sphere. On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted
by referendum to exit the European Union,7 a movement that became
known as “Brexit,”8 severing a political link of over 40 years with the
European Community.9 Although the consequences of the referendum
will not take effect for several years,10 there is widespread speculation
as to the fate of free trade with the UK. Prime Minister Teresa May
has expressed the desire to keep an open movement of goods and
services between the UK and the EU, but rejected the idea of free
movement of people,11 a codified principle of the European Union
since 1993.12 However, many nations have seen the break with the EU
7. Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need To Know About The UK
Leaving The EU, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics32810887 [https://perma.cc/4NC8-877V].
8. Id.
9. A Timeline of Britain’s EU Membership, THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/a-timeline-of-britains-eumembership-in-guardian-reporting [https://perma.cc/K972-ZU4N].
10. Leaving the European Union requires a member state to trigger Article 50 of
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Article 50 allows a member state to notify
the EU of its withdrawal, and obliges the EU to negotiating a withdrawal agreement
with the exiting member state within a two-year period, or another mutually agreed
upon date should the agreement be finalized. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on European Union art. 50, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. C 83/01, 31 [hereinafter TEU
post-Lisbon]; see also Owen Bowcott et al., Supreme Court Rules Parliament Must
Have Vote To Trigger Article 50, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/24/supreme-court-brexit-rulingparliament-vote-article-50 [https://perma.cc/GK69-A8DR] (explaining that the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has ruled that a Parliamentary vote is
necessary for the triggering of Article 50).
11. See Theresa May’s Brexit Speech: What Does It Mean For Free Trade?, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-38658697 [https://perma.cc/
6QFL-5RBW].
12. Susanne Kraatz, Fact Sheets on the European Union, Free Movement of
People, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (June 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.10.3.html [https://perma.cc/R28B4YG2].
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as opening up the possibility for far more economically liberal bilateral
treaties with the UK,13 including President Donald Trump, who has
stated his interest in repealing NAFTA14 and withdrawing from the
World Trade Organization.15 He has also signed an executive order to
withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP),16 a move that critics have stated may set back efforts to curb
the Chinese economic influence in the area.17
Whether the role of free trade agreements will change fundamentally
over the next few years remains to be seen. Political contention over
free trade agreements is not a new phenomenon in U.S. politics.
During its initial implementation, NAFTA was heavily contested.
Although NAFTA was the third free trade agreement negotiated by the
United States, it became the subject of contentious political debate in

13. Some of the countries expressing interest in bilateral trade with the United
Kingdom include New Zealand, China, Canada, Japan and the United States. See
Henry Meyer et al., What the World Thinks About Post Brexit Trade, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 11, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0111/let-s-make-a-deal-what-the-world-thinks-about-post-brexit-trade
[http://perma.cc/E9DM-Q6SU].
14. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
15. William Mauldin, Trump Threatens to Pull U.S. Out of World Trade
Organization, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 24, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2016/07/24/trump-threatens-to-pull-u-s-out-of-world-trade-organization/
[https://perma.cc/C4FN-DQZZ].
16. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a trade pact between 12 nations in the AsiaPacific region and the United States, originally signed on February 4, 2016. See
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://ustr.gov/tpp/#what-is-tpp [https://perma.cc/F6H3-KVYQ].
17. See Donald Trump’s Trade Strategy Starts With Quitting The Trans-Pacific
Partnership, White House Says, ABC AUSTRALIA (Jan. 21, 2017),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-21/donald-trump-trade-strategy-starts-withquitting-asia-pact/8200426 [https://perma.cc/G579-6FUS]; see also Xiang Wang,
Good News For China? No TPP For The U.S., And Now Vietnam, FORBES (Nov. 17,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/xiangwang/2016/11/17/good-news-for-chinano-tpp-for-the-u-s-and-now-vietnam/#233ebfb7b76f
[https://perma.cc/DT3NJK3S].
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the 1992 presidential election, and the beginning of the Clinton
presidency.18
While NAFTA has been the subject of recent political controversy,
it must be distinguished from the TPP and T-TIP. The TPP, although
signed, had not yet been ratified or implemented before it was
undone.19 The longevity of NAFTA has allowed it to become so
ingrained in the United States economy that dismantling it may not be
as simple as anti free-trade proponents have claimed.20 This serves as
proof that trade agreements such as TPP and T-TIP are not necessarily
completely eradicated by short term political shifts. Trade agreements
often take years to negotiate and longer to implement.21 Though they
are often the subject of contentious political debate, these agreements
maintain a long-term stability allowing them to transcend political
change.22
Free trade has a long history in the international economic realm and
in the United States.23 The World Trade Organization (WTO)/General
18. See C. O’Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, And Free Trade
Agreements: Why The NAFTA Turned Into A Battle, 28 GW J. INT’L L. & ECON. 2, 4
(1993).
19. See Donald Trump’s Trade Strategy, supra, note 17.
20. The dismantling of NAFTA could have a large negative effect on the United
States’ economy. Trade experts fear as many as 5 million jobs could be affected
given the dependence of North American economies, and cross border supply chains.
Canada is currently the largest export destination for the United States, followed by
Mexico. See Elizabeth Gurdus, Withdrawing from NAFTA Would Be Trump’s
Gravest Economic Mistake, Says Bush 41 Trade Chief, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2017 12:06
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/13/dismantling-nafta-may-be-trumps-gravesteconomic-mistake-carla-hills.html [https://perma.cc/72E6-TFEZ].
21. See Rosamond Hutt, With Brexit In Mind, Just How Long Do Trade Deals Take
To Agree?, WORLD ECON. FORUM (July 22, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2016/07/how-long-do-trade-deals-take-after-brexit/
[https://perma.cc/3NKX-XUAE];
Christoph Moser & Andrew K. Rose, Why Do Trade Negotiations Take So Long? 5
(Swiss Institute of Business Cycle Research, Working Paper No. 295 & Center for
Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 8993, Jan. 10, 2012).
22. See Roger Lowenstein, Why Attacking Free Trade Is Great Politics and Bad
Economics, FORTUNE (Jan. 23, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/23/trump-naftaprotectionism-tariffs-politics/ [http://perma.cc/A2LN-PB56]; see also Paola
Conconi et al., Policymakers’ Horizon And Trade Reforms (Centro Studi Luca
d’Agliano, Working Paper, Sept. 1, 2011) (comparing politicians preference for trade
expansionist and protectionist ideologies at different generations).
23. I.M. Destler, America’s Uneasy History with Free Trade, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/americas-uneasy-history-with-free-trade
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Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)24 was the preferred
mechanism for trade initiatives until the collapse of the Doha
Agreements,25 an event which shifted stakeholder’s interest to the use
of bilateral and regional trade agreements.26 The increased growth
within the economies of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
countries has also inspired the opening of both markets.27 It is
estimated that the EU’s annual benefit from the T-TIP could be as
much as “0.9 % of GDP, or 163 billion U.S. dollars; the United States
is estimated to realize a 0.8% increase in GDP, or 132 billion U.S.
dollars.”28 The T-TIP is only a recent development in what has been

[https://perma.cc/P756-232M]; see also A Century of Free Trade, BBC NEWS (Feb.
12, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/533716.stm [https://perma.cc/Z29C97MM].
24. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is an agreement established on
October 30, 1947 in Geneva, Switzerland, which covers international trade in goods.
It lasted until April 14, 1994, during the Uruguay Round Agreements, which
established the World Trade Organization. The text of the 1947 agreement (with
1994 modifications) is still in effect and is overseen by the Council for Trade and
Goods, a body composed of WTO members. See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]; see
also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1153, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1994].
25. After the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, members
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) gathered in Doha, Qatar for the fourth
Ministerial Conference where they discussed a broad mandate, including provisions
such as reductions in non-agriculture tariffs and domestic agricultural support
programs, and expansion of coverage in services. In July 2008, negotiations of this
agreement broke down, as parties failed to come to a final consensus on its
provisions. Former WTO Director General Pascal Lamy estimated the cost of this
breakdown could amount to around $130 billion in potential tariff savings per year.
See Robert Wolfe, First Diagnose, Then Treat: What Ails the Doha Round?,
(European Union Institute, Working Paper No. 85, 2013).
26. See Neil Campbell et al., The Impact of New Transatlantic Trade Agreements
on Commercial and Investment Transactions, 16 BUS. L. INT’L 185, 186 (2015).
27. See id. at 187 n.10.
28. Fung, supra note 5, at 446. It should also be noted that these numbers might
be subject to change with the recent vote for the United Kingdom to exit the
European Union. See Steve Erlanger, ‘Brexit’: Explaining Britain’s Vote on
European
Union
Membership,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
21,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/world/europe/britain-european-unionbrexit.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Q8H2-TAGU] (updated Oct. 27, 2016).
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an ongoing move towards free trade agreements. 29 For the reasons
outlined above, although a potential trade deal between the European
Union and the United States is currently under threat, given the
international move to free trade, and the growing need for competition
in both of these sizable markets, discussions are likely to continue in
some form.
B. Basic Structure of Investor State Dispute Settlement and its Role
in Bilateral Trade
Investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS) is a neutral mechanism
established through investment agreements—it provides a forum
where states parties and investors in those parties’ jurisdiction can
bring claims against each other in front of an objective panel, whose
decision has been made binding on both parties through prior
reciprocal agreements.30 ISDS is unique in international law,
obligating states’ parties to take part in arbitration proceedings for any
violation of previously negotiated and signed investment agreements
outside of the jurisdiction of national court systems.31

29. See Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2015) (explaining some scholars have deemed this
movement as “mini-lateralism”—the move from large trade organizations to reliance
on regional trade agreements (RTA) in order to achieve large scale financial and
investment goals).
30. See SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A. WEISS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Congressional Research Service
ed., 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43052.pdf.
31. See David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 7 (Org. for Econ.
Co-operation and Dev., Working Paper No. 3, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/
investment/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf. It should be noted issues of
competence between national court systems and arbiters has been a long subject of
debate, with countries taking a variety of legal stances, in classic arbitration
proceedings. The doctrine of “competence” in arbitration is a long-established
principle allowing arbiters to rule on challenges brought to their jurisdiction over
matters. However, it “cannot completely divest national courts of all authority to
consider challenges to arbitral jurisdiction because it is the courts (and the state’s
enforcement resources), ultimately, which must enforce any arbitration agreements
and awards not voluntarily honored by the parties, and the courts will not enforce
such agreements and awards absent a jurisdictional basis for doing so.” Robert H.
Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International Arbitration: Ex
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Arbitration has grown significantly in the past couple of years, with
most recent treaties incorporating a provision on ISDS.32 There are
roughly 125 international bodies, and 3,000 Bilateral Investment
Agreements (BITs)33 and investment chapters in Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs),34 which compromise the complex system of
ISDS.35 Investment disputes are most frequently arbitrated at the
World Bank International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID),36 which is governed by the International
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID
Convention).37 The United Nations Commission on International
Trade law (UNCITRAL) also oversees some investment disputes as
well, though not nearly the volume of the ICSID.38
As the agreement is still being negotiated, it cannot be said with
certainty what the ISDS provisions will look like in the finalized
Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?, 13 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 19, 25 (2002).
32. In 2012, the OECD produced a scoping paper, in which they explored the
prominence of ISDS in the international investing community, as well as provided
support to inter-governmental dialogue at several OECD hosted roundtable
meetings. From the relevant sample, they found that approximately 93% of bilateral
investment treaties allow for private enforcement. See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra
note 31, at 10.
33. See Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties
[https://perma.cc/JE83-J2LX].
34. See DR. CHRISTIAN TIETJE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF INVESTOR-STATE-DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT (ISDS) IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIP (Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands ed., 2014).
35. See Smit, supra note 31.
36. See Christiane Gerstetter & Nils Meyer-Ohlendorf, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Under TTIP – A Risk For Environmental Regulation?, HEINRICH BÖLL
STIFTUNG TTIP SERIES 4, 7 (2013).
37. World Bank, International Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, Annual Report (2003) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
38. “The UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules provide a comprehensive set of procedural
rules upon which parties may agree for the conduct of arbitral proceedings arising
out of their commercial relationship and are widely used in ad hoc arbitrations as
well as administered arbitrations.” United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html
[hereinafter
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules].
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version. However, there are indicators as to what form they may take.
Firstly, in 2012, the European Union and United States agreed on a
joint document entitled the Shared Principles for International
Investment,39 in which they advocated for strong protection for
investors against potential discriminatory, arbitrary or harmful
treatment, as well as for sound dispute settlement mechanisms,
whereby investors would have access to states parties. In their
negotiations, the US and EU have discussed allowing the tribunals to
be governed by the ICSID Convention,40 the ICSID Additional Facility

39. In April 2012, the EU Trade Commission released a press statement
announcing an agreement by the Transatlantic Economic Council, led by EU Trade
Commissioner Karel De Gucht and Deputy Assistant to the President of the United
States Michael Froman, in order to forward an “ambitious set of investment
principles” between the two parties. See EU And US Adopt Blueprint For Open And
Stable Investment Climates, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=796 [https://perma.cc/6KZR56QN]; see also Statement, European Union, Statement of the European Union and
the United States on Shared Principles for International Investment,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149331.pdf
[hereinafter
Shared Principles].
40. See ICSID Convention, supra note 37.
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Rules,41 arbitration rules under UNCITRAL,42 and any other rules43
agreed by the parties in dispute at the time the complaint is filed.44

41. As of April 10, 2006, 143 states have become contracting members of the
ICSID. On this date, the Administrative Council of the ICSID adopted a set of
additional rules authorizing the Secretariat to govern additional areas outside of the
rules’ original purview. These include

(i) fact-finding proceedings; (ii) conciliation or arbitration proceedings
for the settlement of investment disputes between parties one of which
is not a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State; and (iii)
conciliation and arbitration proceedings between parties at least one of
which is a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State for the
settlement of disputes that do not arise directly out of an investment,
provided that the underlying transaction is not an ordinary commercial
transaction.
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Introduction, ISCID
(Apr. 10, 2006), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/
intro.htm.
42. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 38.
43. There are a vast number of international treaties that currently govern the
legal sphere of arbitration. These include: the New York Convention of 1958,
UNCITRAL rules, as well as a variety of national jurisprudence, and the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice within the European Union. In addition to the
ICSID rules, many arbitration proceedings may find themselves subject to these
conventions, and the norms established by these conventions, either directly or
indirectly. It’s important to note that the arbitration field has a long established
history of norms dealing with questions of competence between national court
systems and arbiters, as well as conduct of third parties and their link to arbitration
proceedings. ISDS, dealing with states’ parties in their entirety, opens up an entirely
new set of concerns when it comes to these conflicts of laws, which both negotiating
parties to the trade deal, during and after it is signed into law. As further developed
in this paper, ICSID is generally the governing body for ISDS disputes. See generally
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (NEW YORK, 1958) (2015)
[hereinafter New York Convention on Arbitration].
44. On November 15, 2015, the European Union submitted and made public a
draft proposal Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes in the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Negotiations with the United States
have been tabled, but a final draft will be submitted once the details of the deal are
finalized. See EU Commission Draft Text, Transatlantic Trade And Investment
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1. ICSID
The ICSID is the most commonly used arbitration forum.45 The
ICSID Convention precludes use of any other judicial mechanism
outside of the arbitration proceedings.46 National courts of bound state
parties are required to refrain from issuing a ruling on any matter that
may fall under the jurisdiction of the ICSID until the matter is referred
to the ICSID, and determined to be outside of its jurisdictional scope.47
The Convention provides a caveat—the committee overseeing a legal
claim can declare a judgment outside of its competence, however that
decision falls within at sole discretion of the committee itself. They
can also refuse a request for arbitration, however the Secretary General
of the ICSID has to date, not chosen to do so.48
Article 14 of the Convention provides that arbiters are to be selected
on the basis of “high moral character and recognized competence in
the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance” that they can rely

Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce (Nov. 15, 2015)
[hereinafter EU Commission Draft Text].
45. See Tamara L. Slater, Investor-State Arbitration And Domestic
Environmental Protection, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 131, 138 n.41
(2015).
46. See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 19, 24.
Article 26: Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall,
unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the
exclusion of any other remedy.
Article 44: Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance
with the provisions of this Section and, except as the parties otherwise
agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on
which the parties consented to arbitration. If any question of procedure
arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any
rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.
47. See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 30. This principle is known as the
“rule of abstention” and can be found in Article 64 of the ICSID Convention.
Article 64: Any dispute between Contracting States concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by
negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by
application of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree
to another method of settlement.
See also Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration And The Courts, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 784, 785 (1983).
48. See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 21.
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upon to exercise independent judgment.49 The members serve
“renewable periods of six years.”50 The convention limits its
competency requirements to these four areas.
There are very few mechanisms for further pursuing a ruling once it
has been issued by the ICSID. Domestic judicial mechanisms do not
offer a sufficient avenue. Both the ICSID as a whole and its arbitrators
are immune from legal liability for actions performed while acting in
their capacity under the Convention,51 and thus are unable to be pulled
into any adverse litigation.
The Convention forbids parties from seeking any other remedy or
appeal outside of the ones provided therein.52 The Convention
provides limited avenues to pursue appeal: parties may request
revision or annulment of the award through writing to the Secretary
General.53 Other than that, there are no avenues for appeal and the
award is binding.54 Additionally, arbiters cannot be disqualified except
for the limited circumstances where one party can challenge the
arbiter’s competence within Article 14 qualifications, but this
determination is solely at the discretion of the committee.55
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 15 (Art. 14).
ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 15 (Art. 15).
See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 16-17 (Arts. 20-1).
See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 18 (Art. 53).
See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 26 (Art. 52).
Article 52(1): Either party may request annulment of the award by an
application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of
the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.
54. See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 27 (Art. 53). While this may be
cause for concern regarding the accountability of arbiters, many of the reasons cited
are to protect the finality of arbitration judgments, the effectiveness, and the
legitimacy of the process as a whole. Additionally, arbitration has also been argued
to protect clients from re-litigating matters. However, many ISDS clients are
sophisticated indicating the preference for arbitration generally. See Michael A.
Helfand, Arbitration, Transparency, And Privatization: Arbitration’s CounterNarrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE L. J. 2994, 3001 (2015).
55. See ICSID Convention, supra note 37, at 27-28 (Art. 57-58).
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2. UNCITRAL
The standards under the UNCITRAL convention are slightly less
stringent than those of the ICSID, but still leave a fair amount of
discretion to the committee itself. Under the UNCITRAL rules, parties
file a notice of arbitration, which requires a response in 30 days.56 The
appointing authority57 then goes on to select an arbiter pursuant to the
rules of the Convention. Typically three arbiters are appointed (each
party having the authority to appoint one as well) but parties may
request the appointing authority appoint a sole arbiter instead.58
Parties may challenge the appointment of an arbiter for facts that
come to light that would create doubt as to this arbiter’s impartiality
by giving a notice of 15 days to the other party, but only for things that
have come to light after the appointment.59 UNCITRAL awards are
binding on the parties, though they may make a challenge as to the
competency of jurisdiction during the proceeding, which the
committee will take into consideration.60 Similar to ICSID, arbiters are
immune from liability against them for any judgment rendered,
however, UNCITRAL specifies an exception for intentional
wrongdoing.61
II. THE CONTROVERSY OF ISDS PROVISIONS: BUSINESS
CONCERNS VS. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
Proponents of ISDS argue that the implementation of ISDS
provisions in an agreement of this size is critical for protecting
investments in foreign markets, whereas many civil society groups
warn of the dangers of ISDS, specifically pointing to the potential of
56. See UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTORSTATE ARBITRATION, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW 6-8 (2013) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL ISDS Rules]; see also G.A. Res. 68/109, Art. 3-4 (Dec. 16, 2013).
57. Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules covers the process by which
arbiters are chosen. Unless previously agreed upon, parties can propose appointing
authorities at any time, including the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague. See UNCITRAL ISDS Rules, supra note 56 at 8-9.
58. In the case of three arbiters, a presiding officer shall be appointed in a similar
fashion as the sole arbiter. See UNCITRAL ISDS Rules, supra note 56, at 10, 19.
59. See UNCITRAL ISDS Rules, supra note 56, at 12-13.
60. See UNCITRAL ISDS Rules, supra note 56, at 18-19.
61. See UNCITRAL ISDS Rules, supra note 56, at 14.
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multinational corporations to evade government regulations designed
to protect the public interest.62 This part will examine the validity of
both of these arguments.
A. Advantages of ISDS
1. Attracting Foreign Investment through Financial Security
Proponents for including ISDS provisions in the eventual agreement
stress that in order to encourage foreign investment, investors must be
promised a certain level of treatment.63 Without a formal arbitration
mechanism, it is very difficult for investors to combat strict
environmental regulation, especially regulations passed after the
implementation of investment agreements.64 However, some have
countered this assertion, stating that where the financial cost of nonparticipation in a newly created market is high enough, many firms
will not be stopped from making a lucrative investment,65 and that
financial security has often been used as a blanket justification for
ISDS.
A more pressing concern of many investors in seeking arbitration
clauses in trade agreements derives from the fear of political bias
towards the multinational corporate community on the part of national
judicial systems, including the risk for corporation.66 It is important to
distinguish the difference between trade and investment and the
implications that this has on corporations. The domain of trade
concerns itself primarily with goods traveling across borders, while
foreign investment requires individual investors to assume the risk of
expending their own capital, and being liable for the laws of the host
62. See AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note 30.
63. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, ATTRACTING US INVESTORS WHILE PROTECTING

EU GOVERNMENTS’ RIGHTS.
64. See Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes In Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 471 (2015).
65. See Robin Broad, Corporate Bias In The World Bank Group’s International
Centre For Settlement Of Investment Disputes: A Case Study Of A Global Mining
Corporation Suing El Salvador, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 851, 872 (2015).
66. See Slater, supra note 45 (citing Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W.
Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L
L. 365 (2003) (explaining the concept of “hometown justice” and the desire by
investors to settle investment disputes with foreign states through arbitration,
especially in Latin America)).
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country they are operating in.67 As a result, investment activists have
pushed for political isolation as a necessary component of any new
trade deals. While, traditionally, trade and investment concern separate
areas of law, in practice, they significantly overlap. Although trade
deals are more commonly within the purview of multinational
agreements, such as in the WTO, the recent move to free trade
agreements disrupts that trend.68 Furthermore, investors and
representatives of the investment community have an active influence
in the negotiations of free trade agreements.69 The risk to investors is
not a result of two fields of the law that are functionally separate, but
instead, from the practical implications of the conflicts of law that arise
when an investor is forced to consider the international investment
treaty it is operating under and the laws of the host state in which it is
conducting business.
The need for financial security has a much more sound basis in the
liability it opens investors to, especially where courts may not be
amicable to the investors within their jurisdiction. There is a fear
within the investor community of the trend of what is called
“hometown justice,” in which states courts react more favorably
towards citizens or representatives of the host country in which they
are operating.70 This concern extends past the purview of
environmental protection, such as with competing economic interests
of host states and investors,71 but there are still arguments for the
67. Peter H. Chase, TTIP, Investor–State Dispute Settlement And The Rule Of
Law, 14 EUR. VIEW 217, 217-29 (2015).
68. See Puig, supra note 29; see also Wolfe, supra note 25.
69. How to Influence Trade Negotiations, INT’L TRADE CENTRE,
http://www.intracen.org/itc/policy/how-to-influence-trade-negotiations/
[https://perma.cc/2RUE-9R8Z].
70. One example of this “hometown justice” trend is the ruling in Chevron Corp.
v. Donzinger where the United States Southern District of New York found Steven
Donziger, the lead lawyer behind the Ecuadorian lawsuit against the company,
violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in
his initial investigations. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016).
71. See Timothy J. Tyler & James L. Loftis, Implications of Exxon Mobil v.
Venezuela, LAW360 (July 19, 2010), https://www.law360.com/articles/180073/
implications-of-exxon-mobil-v-venezuela [https://perma.cc/Z7ZC-S658] (stating
“foreign investors like Exxon Mobil can gain the protection of international treaty
law, but only if their holdings are in the right places, namely in those countries with
treaties with the host state. And it is important to structure the treaty chain before
disputes arise. Later attempts invite challenges. If ExxonMobil relied solely on
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implementation of ISDS generally when it comes to environmental
litigation.72 ICSID arbitration has gained popularity due to its isolation
from scrutiny or control of domestic states that have signed the
Convention, whether directly or through agreement.73
Rather than decreasing the policy space for environmental
regulation, a motivating factor for including these provisions is
motivated by the need for an efficient forum that is shielded from the
internal politics of states parties in a way that individual judicial
forums may not be.74
2. Uncertainty of Abuse by Multinational Companies
ISDS supporters point to the history of ISDS use in trade agreements
so far, stating of the 20 FTAs it has been incorporated in, there should
be statistical data reflecting the abuse of the arbitration mechanism by
multinational companies.75 In fact, of the over 2000 BITs currently in
place, 90% of them have never had operated without a single investor
claim of treaty breach.76 Many of the accusations of political
involvement and non-meritorious claims are said to be exaggerated—
most in the investment community emphasize that a large reason for
the increase in ISDS litigation can be tied to the general increase of the
number of investors and capital invested abroad.77 Additionally,

Venezuelan law, it would have been out of luck - and could have been out of
billions”).
72. In regard to the argument surrounding isolation from “hometown justice,” it
is unclear whether investors are deterred. The potential for fraud and unjust process
must be distinguished from the enforcement of principles that inconvenience
investors, or deviations permissible under an envisioned treaty.
73. See Delaume, supra note 47.
74. See Tyler & Loftis, supra note 71.
75. Of the more than 500 cases brought into ICSID since its inception, 36% have
been settled before appearing before a tribunal and only 13 have commenced action
against the United States, none of which found the United States liable. See Gary
Clyde Hufbauer, Senator Warren Distorts the Record on Investor-State Dispute
Settlements, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://piie.com/
blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/senator-warren-distorts-record-investor-statedispute [https://perma.cc/9WDD-SBB2].
76. See Scott Miller & Greg Hicks, Investor - State Dispute Settlement: A Reality
Check (Ctr. For Strategic and Int’l Stud. (CSIS), Working Paper Oct. 29, 2014).
77. See id.
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lawyers are selected from a large panel, with opportunities to object by
all parties to the arbitration78 and sworn to take an oath of impartiality.
Proponents have also pointed out that ISDS is not a foreign process
being imposed onto the United States, but, instead, a mechanism
designed and forwarded by the United States in order to embody
United States’ legal principles.79 However, the case of the European
Union is much more complicated, given the large number of member
states, and the varying national interests at play.
B. Criticisms Of ISDS Mechanisms
This section examines the critiques of ISDS, including the potential
for companies to evade national regulation by suing outside of
traditional judicial mechanisms, issues of political insulation and role
of international law.
1. Evasion of National Regulation
i. Challenging Domestic Environmental Regulation in NonDomestic Courts
Generally, the criticism against ISDS and environmental challenges
tends to focus on developing countries, due to vulnerability of poorer
populations in these areas.80 However, in the case of the T-TIP, since
the two parties represent such a large percentage of the global GDP,
they hold a similar negotiating power, so different concerns have risen.
Specifically, the culture of environmental protection in the EU and the
potential for its erosion has alarmed many in civil society.81
There is an apprehension within the environmental community that
T-TIP has the potential to provide a forum for challenging
environmental regulation on a much larger scale than previous
agreements. Much of this criticism comes after seeing the effects of
78. See ICSID Convention, supra note 37.
79. See Hufbauer, supra note 75.
80. See Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ARB/09/12 (2014);

see also Slater, supra note 45.
81. See UNWELT BUNDESAMT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNDER TTIP,
(Fed. Env’t Agency 2015), https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/
medien/376/publikati onen/environmental_protection_under_ttip_0.pdf.
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the ISDS provisions within NAFTA,82 which have allowed investors
to bring forth claims against states for any regulation that has, or that
they have perceived to have, harmed the investor’s property or
investment.83 Indeed, Canada has become the most sued country under
NAFTA, and the most sued country over ISDS generally, largely due
to the environmental regulations they have in place.84
A vocal advocate against ISDS provisions in trade agreements has
been United States Senator Elizabeth Warren, who has actively warned
against the risks of corporate abuse of arbitration against states.85
Specifically, ISDS might allow foreign companies to “challenge U.S.
laws—and potentially to pick up huge payouts from taxpayers—
without ever stepping foot in a U.S. court.”86 There is an underlying
sentiment that similar to other private stakeholders, investors should
have to pursue the avenues granted to them by their host country, or to
persuade their own government to engage in state-to-state litigation
over bilateral investment treaties on their behalf.87 In fact, in 2009, the
82. See NAFTA, supra note 14.
83. See Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen

Submissions under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 148-49 (2002); see
also Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA
Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 103 (2008) (explaining investors need
only satisfy the evidentiary burden set forth by the convention under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA).
84. See Sunny Freeman, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Makes Canada Most-Sued
Country Under Free Trade Tribunals, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/1 4/canada-sued-investor-state-dispute-ccpa
_n_6471460.html [https://perma.cc/DVP7-KUPA]. “Canada has lost or settled six
claims paying a total of $170 million in damages, while Mexico has lost five cases
and paid out $204 million. The U.S., meanwhile, has won 11 cases and has never
lost a NAFTA investor-state case.” Id.
85. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should
Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/
25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/G47PHQ3X].
86. Becky L. Jacobs, A Perplexing Paradox: “De-Stratification” of “InvestorState” Dispute Settlement?, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 17, 18 (2015) (quoting Warren,
supra note 85).
87. Marco Bronckers, Is Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Superior to
Litigation Before Domestic Courts?: An EU View on Bilateral Trade Agreements,
18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655 (2015).
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State Department recommended ISDS be replaced with state-to-state
litigation mechanisms similar to those in bilateral investment
agreements, stating:
[I]f the administration continues to include an investor-state
dispute settlement mechanism, investors should be required
to exhaust domestic remedies before filing a claim before an
international tribunal. That mechanism should also provide
a screen that allows the Parties to prevent frivolous claims
or claims which otherwise may cause serious public harm.88
ii. Double Adjudication
Given the complexity of the regulatory schemes of both bodies,
there is a risk that many investment claims being brought to arbitration
may either be claims that had already been addressed by national
courts or that were substantially similar enough to previous claims.
The provisions of the ICSID and UNCITRAL Conventions are written
broadly, giving guidance only as to the fact that both committees are
in charge of determining the scope of their competence.
While it is true that technically ISDS does not have the power to
overturn any domestic environmental litigation,89 it is not necessary to
have a the literal overturning of regulation in order to chill legislation,
instead it is possible to de-incentivize environmental regulation—
essentially by deciding cases against states who issue environmental
regulation, ISDS can create de-facto stop order on all environmental
reform that potentially can lead to large fines for the host state. In fact,
there is some difficulty in assessing which regulations investors may
be successful in pursuing, given that neither UNCITRAL or ICSID

88. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTMENT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REGARDING THE

MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: ANNEXES (2009).
89. See Linda Dempsey, Three Facts Apologists for Foreign Mistreatment of U.S.
Manufacturers Should At Least Acknowledge, NAT’L ASS’N OF MFRS. (Feb. 27,
2015),
http://www.shopfloor.org/2015/02/three-facts-apologists-for-foreign-mis
treatment-of-u-s-manufacturers-should-at-least-acknowledge/
[https://perma.cc/DJ65-Y42D ].
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conventions nor are their judgments legally binding. 90 A number of
countries have left ICSID,91 due to the fact that it makes no use of
precedent and it gives itself such a wide jurisdictional reach.
There is a potential that the vague definition of investors92 and loose
standing requirements93 will provide a “catch-all” definition for
standing under the treaty, allowing many more parties the ability to
bring suit against either the EU or the US, and for other investors to
follow suit.
2. Lack of Political Isolation/Potential Bias of Proceedings
The use of ISDS has risen dramatically in the last couple of years.94
As a result, there has been increasing criticism about the structure of
ISDS proceedings and the potential for bias within the process.95 The
fear of bias within ISDS proceedings is not unfounded, as the amount
of arbitration cases being decided in favor of investors tips in favor of
investors.96
There are many factors that lead to this phenomenon. First off, most
ISDS proceedings give parties a guarantee of confidentiality97 making
90. See generally UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 38; see also
UNCITRAL ISDS Rules, supra note 56; August Reinisch, The Role of Precedent in
ICSID Arbitration, in AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 495-510 (2008).
91. See Broad, supra note 65, at 869.
92. See Shared Principles, supra note 39.
93. See id.; see also ICSID Convention, supra note 37.
94. See Slater, supra note 45; see also CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY,
PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE
FUELING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM at 4, 8 (2012), https://
www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf.
95. See Howard Mann, ISDS: Who Wins More, Investors or States?,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT TREATY
NEWS, June 2015, http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/itnbreaking-news-june-2015-isds-who-wins-more-investors-or-state.pdf.
96. See Slater, supra note 45, at 137-38 (“As of the end of 2012, 244 disputes had
been resolved through arbitration under various ISDS provisions with approximately
42% decided in favor of the state, 31% decided in favor of the investor, and 27%
settled, typically on confidential terms. In 2012, however, 12 out of 17 decisions,
71%, rendered on the merits accepted - in part or in full - the claims of the
investors.”).
97. See generally Olivier Oakley-White, Confidentiality Revisited: Is
International Arbitration Losing One of Its Major Benefits?, 6 INT’L ARB. L. REV.
29 (2003).
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it difficult to ascertain a sense of transparency about the process.
Second, parties who frequently litigate in these contexts may retain an
influence over the arbitrators, creating difficulty in shielding the
arbitration from bias.98
A large critique centers on the lack of representation of state parties
involved in potential arbitration. Critics have pointed to the lack of
geographical bias among the members of ICSID members, noting that
“sixty eight percent of arbitrators, conciliators, and ad hoc committee
members that judge the tribunal cases are from North America and
Western Europe, while their home countries represent only 6% of all
state respondents in ICSID case[s].”99
More concerning to critics than geographical bias is the fact that
many arbitration proceedings conducted within ICSID tend to involve
a small group of arbitrators, and an even smaller group of law firms
representing investor parties. A 2012 report published by the
Transnational Institute, an advocacy and research institute, revealed
that Freshfields (UK), White & Case (US) and King & Spalding (US)
can be traced to the involvement of at least 130 investment treaty cases
in 2011 alone and that “15 arbitrators, nearly all from Europe, the US
or Canada, have decided 55% of all known investment-treaty
disputes.”100 In fact, the world of ISDS consists of a “revolving door”
of experts serving as counsel and investors on a number of different
cases.101
Although there is a fair amount of criticism of the ICSID
proceedings because of the frequency with which they are used, the
UNCITRAL proceedings have their own issues of transparency as
well.102

98.
99.
100.
101.

See CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY, supra note 94.
See Slater, supra note 45, at 140.
CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY, supra note 94, at 8, 38.
See Sergio Puig, Emergence & Dynamism In International Organizations:
ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & International Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 531, 592 (2013).
102. See Samuel Levander, Resolving “Dynamic Interpretation”: An Empirical
Analysis of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
506, 535 (2014).
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3. The Role of International Law
An added layer of complexity arises when states have signed onto
international legal obligations. There is a difficulty that arises when
assessing the responsibility of states under their international
commitments and their international commitments to investment
treaties. This is especially the case within the European Union, due to
the large number of member states and potential for liability.
The European Union has openly stated its commitment to the Rio
Declaration,103 and although the Rio Declaration is not binding as an
instrument of law, the European Union has codified its adherence to
one of its major principles, the “Precautionary Principle.”104 The
Precautionary Principle provides that “[w]here there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”105 The difficulty in harmonizing
environmental regulation between the two parties derives from the fact
that while the Precautionary Principle has been well integrated in the
EU, since its establishment,106 the United States. does not formally
adhere to the Precautionary Principle,107 creating a wide variation of

103. See RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (1992),
http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/RIO_E.PDF.
104. See id. (Principle 15).
105. See id.
106. “Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the
Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles
that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a
priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. Environmental
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of
other Community policies.” Treaty on European Union, Title XVI, Art. 130r, July
29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1 at 60, http://eur opa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/
treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union _en.pdf [herein
after Maastricht TEU].
107. James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A
Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global
Environment, 14 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1991) (citing United States’
vocal opposition to the Precautionary Principle); contra Jonathan B. Wiener &
Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution In The United States And Europe, 5 J. OF
THE
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environmental standards for products within the two markets. While
how the two environmental regulatory regimes will be harmonized is
unclear, the inclusion ISDS provisions into T-TIP negotiations has
created an apprehension among EU member states that US based
companies doing business in the EU may be able to bring them into
arbitration for violating the provisions of the investment treaty,
without having to go through EU or member state judicial
mechanisms.108
Additionally another concern of environmentalists is that the use of
ISDS provisions will make it difficult to invoke general exception
clauses for good faith measures taken for public welfare objectives,
notably, environmental or public health measures.109 Previously, these
general exception clauses have allowed the EU to protect its
environmental interests in both GAT and GATTS.110 It is unclear how
much of an impact general exception clauses would have in arbitration
proceedings, a risk which leaves environmental protectionists wanting
stronger safeguards and flexibility for national regulation.111
Accordingly, in November of 2013, the EU released to the United
States, a draft proposal for the agreement that would incorporate areas

RISK RES. 317 (2002) (arguing that although not formally adherent, in practice, the
United States is not necessarily less precautionary than the EU).
108. It should be noted that if the deal were finalized, the precautionary principle
would have to be addressed in its entirety, given its prominence in European Union
discourse. This may be solved during the standardization of regulations, rather than
individual arbitration hearings, but the issue of conflict of laws still remains.
109. See Levent Sabanogullari, The Merits and Limitations of General Exception
Clauses in Contemporary Investment Treaty Practice, 6 INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS
3 (2015), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/05/21/the-merits-and-limitations-of-general
-exception-clauses-in-contemporary-investment-treaty-practice/.
110. The clauses in both tend to include the following legal structures:
1. An exhaustive list of permissible policy objectives; for example, the
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, or the conservation of
natural resources;
2. A nexus requirement, denoting the required link between a state
measure and a permissible objective; frequently used nexus requirements
include “necessary for,” “relating to,” and “designed and applied for;” and
3. A prohibition of discriminatory or arbitrary application.
See id.
111. See id.
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on trade and sustainable development.112 Within this agreement, they
directly reference both the Rio Declaration and the Sustainable
Development Goals, as well as note the benefit of considering trade
and environmental protection within their discussions. The text of the
agreement also outlines a commitment by both parties to international
environmental commitments and a good faith effort to regulate, and
the right to regulate, in line with those obligations. Furthermore, this
version asks both parties to adhere to the principles of Corporate Social
Responsibility, by openly supporting the text of both the UN Global
Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.113 At the
present moment, it does not seem likely that the United States will
accept many of the draft proposals submitted within the text of this
section, however, that remains to be seen as the negotiations continue.
Furthermore, while ambitious, this text of the agreement helps
ameliorate the position of state parties while in arbitration, but does
not incorporate a structural argument as to how these principles can be
incorporated into the structure of the ISDS provisions.
III. BALANCING INVESTOR PROTECTIONS WITH
APPROPRIATE STRUCTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SAFEGUARDS
There are risks and benefits to ISDS that will arise as the issue
continues to be negotiated. This part will examine solutions to
balancing concerns by both environmental advocates and investors.
The European Union has made public its desire in these negotiations
to advocate for both transparency and mechanisms for appeal in order
to address concerns that have been raised about binding states party’s
to adverse arbitration decisions.114 There has been a lot of criticism
also surrounding the inability of appeal in both conventions.115 In
112. “This textual proposal is the European Union’s initial proposal for legal text
on ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ in TTIP. It was tabled for discussion with
the US in the negotiating round of 19 - 23 October 2015 and made public on 6
November 2015.” EU Textual Proposal Trade And Sustainable Development, COM
(2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153923.pdf
113. See id. at Art. 20.
114. See EU Commission Draft Text, supra note 44.
115. See id.
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response to these criticisms, the European Commission proposed
setting up an Investment Court System (ICS) with judges publicly
appointed by the EU and US as well as an appeals tribunal, with three
judges from the US, EU, and a third impartial country.116 To ensure
effective, impartial rulings, the Commission also recommends judges
“hold qualifications comparable to judges in other international courts,
such as the International Court of Justice,” be assigned to cases on
random basis, follow a strict set of rules on ethics, and be banned from
working as legal counsel on any other investment disputes while they
act as judge.117 The committee contends that the presence of an appeals
tribunal and transparent procedures combats the problems of
legitimacy and consistency raised by critics.118
While these reforms address a number of concerns, they do not go
far enough to ensure accountability within the proceedings. A key
distinction in the structure of these arbitration hearings is that the two
parties to the underlying trade agreement both possess a fair amount
of bargaining power. Unlike many trade conventions between smaller
countries and the EU or US, where the incentive to close the deal is
higher on one side, the EU and US, representing such a large portion
of the global GDP, are in a position to take as much time as each party
needs in order to reach a deal that addresses the differences in their
environmental and trade policies. In order to adequately balance the
concerns of both the investor community and of environmental
activists, ISDS reforms must address the following:
A. Structure of Proceedings and Selection of Arbiters
As stated earlier, ISDS mechanisms are incorporated in a large
number of treaties,119 and there is a genuine argument as to the benefit
of having them as politically isolated as possible. The efficiency and
isolation with which arbitration hearings are able to settle litigation is
one of the key incentives for their incorporation into trade agreements.
116. The Investment Court System would be compromised of: an Investment
Tribunal with 15 judges (five EU nationals, five U.S. nationals, five nationals of
other countries) and an Appeals Tribunal with 6 judges (two EU nationals, two U.S.
nationals, and 2 nationals of other countries). See id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See Smit, supra note 31.
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Rather than having arbiters appointed by member states, which may
politicize the selection process (especially in a contentious political
atmosphere), an alternative to shielding the process would be to have
a closed pool of potential arbiters, with an allocated number of spots
for nationals or representatives from each party.120 In addition to
competencies in trade, financial, and commerce law, there should also
be a requirement for a minimum number of arbiters to have
qualifications in the fields of human rights, environmental law, and
sustainability, in order to balance the interests of both states’ parties
and investors in the arbitration proceedings.
It is not necessary to have an equal number of arbiters of each
discipline in each and every proceeding; however, there should be a
robust process in place for vetting qualifications and impartiality both
before the confirmation of arbiters and the appointment of arbiters to
a case.
Impartiality and independence have long been an integral part to the
legitimacy of the arbitration process, with arbiters having an
affirmative duty to disclose all potential biases in the cases they
oversee, or risk having their sentences later overturned.121 However, in
the domain of competence, where there is a conflict of law, the
Secretary General should be able to provide detailed reasoning as to
why none of the national judicial mechanisms involved in a specific
litigation are the correct authority for a particular case, so as to create
increased transparency and create a precedent for similar cases.
B. Appeals Tribunal
The EU has proposed their own version of an Appeals Tribunal,122
rather than relying on the finality of arbitration decisions. This is a
good first step in making the process more approachable and just.
Given the rate of cases being settled before they get to arbitration,123 a
robust appeals tribunal may incentivize states parties to fully pursue
120. Instead of basing it on nationality, allowing member states to choose arbiters
they find most favorable to their interest is more effective.
121. See Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators (Art. 3.2), IBA RULES OF
ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS 1987, https://www.trans-lex.org/7011
00/_/iba-rules-of-ethics-for-international-arbitrators-1987/.
122. EU Commission Draft Text, supra note 44, at Art. 10.
123. See id.
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claims before defaulting to a settlement. The proposal calls for the
appointment of six members— two EU nationals, two US nationals,
and two of other countries—to serve for six-year terms.124 Unlike the
initial selection process for arbiters, there is a benefit to relying on
nationality as a proxy for impartiality here because the appeals tribunal
should be set before cases appear in front of it. This ensures the finality
that ISDS seeks to provide as well as the consistency of rulings within
the process.
Lastly, the EU recommends members of the Appeal Tribunal
possess “the qualifications required in their respective countries for
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or be jurists of recognized
competence” and mention expertise in public international law, as well
as “international investment law, international trade law and the
resolution of disputes arising under international investment or
international trade agreements.”125 However, they should also include
language regarding expertise in the fields of human rights and
environmental law for at least some of the members, in order to ensure
a wider range of considerations in each of the appeals.
C. Implementing Environmental Principles within T-TIP Generally
In their draft proposal, the EU has not addressed the effect of this
deal on both parties’ international obligations, especially when it
comes to the EU’s strong commitment to environmental protection. It
is important for both the United States and the European Union to
decide upon the environmental principles both parties are committed
to before the T-TIP can be finalized. The question of regulations and
how to handle contradictions of the law is one that is best addressed
by the treaty writing process. If the EU is serious about its commitment
to the Precautionary Principle and the Rio Declaration, it shall continue
to push for its implementation in T-TIP, as it has with similar trade
deals in the past.126 It is important for the finalized agreement to reflect
the spirit of the laws and commitments of both parties.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. “CETA [EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement]

makes clear from the outset that the EU and Canada preserve their right to regulate
and to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as public health, safety,
environment, public morals, social or consumer protection and the promotion and
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However, if the US refuses to acknowledge the Precautionary
Principle in its investment treaty, then the EU must examine which
specific industries it seeks to open trade with in the US, and limit the
scope of the free trade deal, if they are to reach an agreement. Either
way, the final version of the deal must be one which reflects the culture
of environmental law of both parties, and which does not lead to later
collisions with national legislation and regulation.
In order to shield themselves from certain lawsuits beforehand, both
the EU and US should determine a set of claims that are definitively
outside the competence of arbiters. The broad language of forums such
as the ICSID and UNCITRAL have the potential to bypass national
court systems on a larger scope of litigation than either party may be
seeking by signing this treaty. Accordingly, there is an incentive for
each party to make reservations in the text of the treaty regarding the
areas they determine to be within the exclusive scope of their national
court systems.
CONCLUSION
The move to free trade agreements is one that will continue to
change the nature of the international financial sector in the coming
years. With increased trade commitments, comes increased liability
and standardization of markets, commitments, and cultural norms. The
discussion of investment and trade between the European Union and
the United States speaks to a contrast between the motives of each state
party, but also with the larger international community, which is
becoming more engaged with environmental protection and the role of
corporate social responsibility.
Investor State Dispute Settlements are a byproduct of a need for
efficiency and security, and although their importance should not be
understated, they cannot take a backseat to environmental protections,
especially not with the possibility of a trade deal as massive as the TTIP. The investment and trade communities of both the United States
and the European Union should take proactive steps in order to reform
the currently proposed ISDS mechanisms in order to ensure
protection of cultural diversity.” See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INVESTMENT
PROVISIONS IN THE EU-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA) (2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf.
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impartiality, efficiency, and fairness, and to resolve any conflicts of
law between the states’ commitments before they arise.

